

**Gorkem  
Celik**

**Professeur  
Associé,  
Département  
Économie**



## Contact

✉ **Mail:**  
celik@essec.fr  
✉ Avenue Bernard  
Hirsch.  
BP 50105  
95021 Cergy Pontoise  
cedex  
FRANCE

## Formation

Ph.D. Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA

Dissertation "Three Essays on the Informational Aspects of Untrustworthy Experts, Elusive Agents and Corrupt Supervisors"

Committee Co-chairs: Jeffrey Ely, Michael Whinston

Committee Members: David Austen-Smith, Asher Wolinsky

B.A. in Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey

## Biographie

Gorkem Celik teaches economics in the PhD, advanced masters, and MBA programs. Before joining ESSEC in 2009, he worked at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. Gorkem is an economic theorist. He studies what type of economic institutions and mechanisms are needed to achieve specific objectives. His main focus is on settings where individuals hold relevant *private information* (such as the cost of providing a service or the value of using it), but are unwilling to reveal this information due to conflicting self interests. Gorkem uses *game theory* to understand how people react to different rules under different information structures. Gorkem's research is published in several academic journals, including *Journal of Economic Theory* and *Games and Economic Behavior*. During his doctoral studies, Gorkem has been named the inaugural recipient of the *Robert Eisner Graduate Fellowship* for his distinguished performance in teaching and research.

[Research Statement](#) (August 2008)

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## Thèmes de recherche

Primary: Contract theory, Economics of Information

Secondary: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Positive Political Theory, Law and Economics

## Projets en cours

[Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism](#), joint work with [Michael Peters](#), under revision.

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## Publications

### ✉ Publications académiques

#### Articles

"Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism" (G. Celik, M. Peters), *Games and Economic Behavior*, nov. 2011, Vol. 73, Numéro 2, p. 375-387

"Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation " (G. Celik, O. Yilankaya), *The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances)* , juil. 2009, Vol. 9, Numéro 1

"Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision" (G. Celik), *Journal of Economic Theory*, janv. 2009, Vol. 144, Numéro 1, p. 69-95

"On the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Enforcers" (G. Celik, S. Sayan), *Review of Economic Design*, sept. 2008, Vol. 12, Numéro 3, p. 209-227

"Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties" (G. Celik), *The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions)*, févr. 2008, Vol. 8, Numéro 1

"Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints" (G. Celik), *Games and Economic Behavior*, juil. 2006, Vol. 56, Numéro 1, p. 37-44

### ▾ Working Papers

"RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIPS AND MECHANISM DESIGN" (avec M. Peters). The University of British Columbia, août 11.

"Optimal auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation" (avec O. Yilankaya). UBC Department of Economics, janv. 05.

"Interested Experts: Do They Know More?" The University of British Columbia, mars 03.

### ▾ Autres activités pédagogiques

2002 - 2009 - Assistant Professor, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

Oct 2006-Aug 2007 - Visiting Assistant Professor, Koc University, Istanbul, Turkey

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## Autres activités

### ▾ Prix et distinctions

2000-2001: Robert Eisner Graduate Fellowship, Department of Economics, Department of Economics, Northwestern University (awarded annually to a graduate student who has distinguished himself in both teaching and research)

1998: Distinction in the Preliminary Exams in Microeconomics, Macroeconomics and Econometrics, Department of Economics, Northwestern University

1997-1998: University Fellowship, Northwestern University